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This paper presents the trends seen over the last quarter of the 20
th 
Century in various indicators of the well-being of the elderly 
alongside those seen for the young. Specifically we look at measures 
of both the level and distribution of income and expenditure, and 
self-reported measures of life satisfaction and health. We then 
exploit the substantial reforms to the UK pension system over this 
period to examine the impact of reforms to state pensions on these 
outcomes. We find that increases in the generosity of state pensions 
have led to increased incomes of the elderly and reductions in 
measures of both relative and absolute income poverty. We also find 
that increased state pensions have led to increased expenditure by 
the elderly. It is perhaps not surprising that in the UK the reforms 
to the generosity of state pensions have affected outcomes among 
the elderly (instead of being fully offset by individuals when they 
were younger) given that often very little (pre-retirement) notice was 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the mid 1970s there has been substantial reform to the UK state pension 
system. This began with legislation in 1975 which introduced the first pay-as-you-go 
earnings-related state pension of note in the UK (the State Earnings-Related Pension 
Scheme, SERPS).
1 This represented a large increase in the generosity of future state 
pensions. In response to the very large increase in future taxation that would have been 
required further reform soon followed. These reforms (legislated in 1980, 1986 and 1995) 
significantly scaled back the generosity, and hence the financial cost, of future state 
pensions. In contrast a more recent reform (legislated in 2000) has increased the 
generosity of future state pensions, although for many alive today the impact will be to 
slow the decline in generosity, rather than to increase the generosity of state pensions, 
over successive cohorts (Disney and Emmerson, 2005). 
The state pension reforms since 1980 have improved the financial sustainability 
of the UK’s public finances. However, unless fully offset through other changes (for 
example through increased private retirement saving or delayed retirement), they will also 
reduce the living standards enjoyed by the elderly. The objective of this paper is to 
evaluate the affect these reforms have had on a number of different potential indicators 
of the well-being of the elderly. Specifically we examine the impact of the reforms on the 
elderly in terms of the level of both family income and household expenditure, the 
proportion of elderly below different indicators of family income and household 
expenditure poverty, and also self-reported health status and life satisfaction. 
Section 2 provides a brief description of trends in financial state support for the 
elderly in the UK and the key reforms that took place in the last quarter of the 20
th 
Century. Section 3 describes the data on potential indicators of well-being of the elderly 
used in the analysis. We present changes over time in selected potential indicators of the 
well-being of the population aged 55 and over alongside changes in the same measure 
among the population aged 25 to 49 (inclusive). Section 4 describes the empirical strategy 
employed, and provides details of our constructed simulated state pension income by age 
and cohort, and a comparison with the actual level of state pension income received. The 
results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
                                                 
1 The graduated pension was introduced by the 1959 National Insurance Act and covered those in 
employment but not contracted out into an occupational pension between 3
rd April 1961 and 5
th April 
1975. Average payments under this scheme are relatively ungenerous, not least because entitlements 
were frozen in cash terms between April 1961 and November 1978 during which period prices   3
2.  Financial state support for the elderly in the UK 
 
Public spending on state pensions in the UK increased from just under 1.5% of 
national income in 1948–49 to 4.8% of national income in 1980–81. Since then, as 
shown in Figure 2.2, both public spending on state pensions, and total public spending 
on transfer payments to pensioners (i.e. including means-tested benefits and other 
payments such as annual winter fuel payments) has remained broadly constant as a share 
of national income.  
Figure 2.1 State spending on financial transfers to pensioners in Great Britain, 





























































































Source: Emmerson, C., Tetlow, G. and Wakefield, M. (2005). 
 
In the period since 1980 there have been two key factors which have helped 
prevent the financial cost of state transfer payments to pensioners in the UK from 
increasing as a share of national income. First, as a result of the increase in the birth rate 
that occurred after the end of World War II, the size of the pensioner population relative 
to the working-age population has been almost constant since 1980 (see figures 1.6 and 
1.7 of Pensions Commission, 2004). Second the 1980 decision to formally index 
increases in the Basic State Pension (the flat rate contributory component of the UK 
system) with the growth in prices as opposed to the greater of growth in earnings or 
prices which had previously been the case. Despite adhoc above inflation increases in the 
                                                                                                                                          
quadrupled. In September 2004 total payments cost the Government an annualised equivalent of £1.4 
billion (0.1% of GDP).    4
Basic State Pension (for example in April 2001 and April 2002) its level has fallen relative 
to average wages (which in the UK, unlike the US, rose in real terms during the 1980s). 
Figure 2.2 shows the annual value of a full Basic State Pension for a single 
pensioner in both 2001 Euros (left hand axis) and 2001 UK pounds (right hand axis) 
from its introduction in July 1948 through to April 2005. Over the 25 year period from 
1980 to 2005 the value of the Basic State Pension was increased by 14% in real terms. 
This is in stark contrast to preceding 25 years from 1955 to 1980 when the (after 
inflation) value of the Basic State Pension more than doubled.  
Figure 2.2 Annual value of the full Basic State Pension for a single pensioner, 

















































































































Source: Value of Basic State Pension in £ per week taken from Table 5.1 of Department for Work and 
Pensions (2004), Annual Abstract of Statistics 
(http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/abstract/Abstract2004.pdf). Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using 
the Retail Price Index from the Office for National Statistics 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
The broadly constant level of state spending on transfer payments to pensioners 
seen since 1980–81 is perhaps even more surprising given that SERPS, which was 
legislated for in 1975, was introduced from April 1978. However in addition to the falling 
generosity of a full Basic State Pension (relative to average earnings) the full financial cost 
of the original SERPS would not have been felt until 2030 as it took 20 years to build a 
full entitlement to the original scheme.
2 
                                                 
2 The 1975 Social Security Act also increased future Basic State Pension entitlements through the 
introduction of Home Responsibilities Protection which meant that from April 1978 periods spent   5
The future generosity of SERPS payments has since been radically scaled back
3, 
with the reforms announced in 1986 and 1995 reducing estimated spending in 2030 to 
around a quarter of what it would have been had the scheme been left unreformed 
(Emmerson and Johnson, 2002). These reductions to the generosity of SERPS have 
largely been through a combination of “parametric” reforms (Disney, 2000) to the 
formula used to calculate entitlements and through a pre-announced increase in the state 
pension age for women from 60 to 65.
4 Further details of these reforms are discussed 
below in Box 2.1 (which is taken from Attanasio, et al, 2004). 
State spending on the Basic State Pension and SERPS (and its replacement the 
State Second Pension (S2P)) is now projected by the UK Department for Work and 
Pensions to fall slightly from 4.3% of national income in 2005–06 to 4.6% of national 
income in 2055–56.
5 Once spending on other transfer payments, and in particular the 
means-tested Pension Credit, is included total spending is forecast to rise from 6.3% of 
national income in 2004–05 to 8.0% of national income in 2055–56, with all of the 
forecast increase occurring in the last 20 years. Despite this the most recent projections 
by the European Commission suggest that the UK will continue to have a relatively low 
level of pension spending compared to many other EU countries.
6 Over this period the 
number of pensioners in the UK is forecast to increase from 11.3 million in 2005 to 18.2 
million in and 2056, growth of some 62% despite the planned increase in the state 
pension age for women. Taken together these projections imply that state spending per 
pensioner as a share of national income is set to fall to approximately eighty percent of 
its current level over the next fifty years. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
without NI contributions but with formal caring responsibilities reduced the number of years of 
contributions required. Periods with formal caring responsibilities prior to April 1978 are not eligible. 
In addition the right of married women to pay reduced rate National Insurance Contributions in return 
for not receiving a Basic State Pension in their own right was ended in April 1977. Those already opted 
out were allowed to continue to pay this reduced rate. Hence the full impact of both of these changes 
on entitlements to state pensions will not be felt until the middle of the 21
st Century. 
3 The financial costs of the original SERPS were only originally calculated through to 2000 and not 
through to 2030. When calculations were done (Hemming and Kay, 1980) the implied contribution 
rates were deemed unsustainably high. 
4 The female state pension age is set to be increased by 1 month every 2 months between 2010 and 
2020. 
5 Figures from Table LT.3 of Department for Work and Pensions (2005) Benefit Expenditure Tables, 
Long-Term Projections (figures dated 5
th December 2005) 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/long_term.asp These figures are not the same as those contained in 
figure 2.1 as these are for the UK whereas those in figure 2.1 are for Great Britain. 
6 See Table I.18 and Table 1.19 of European Commission (2005).   6
 
Box 2.1. Reforms to the UK state pension system, 1980 to present day 
Reductions in generosity of the state system: 
Social Security Act 1980  State pension payments to be increased by growth in prices 
instead of the greater of growth in prices or earnings. 
Social Security Act 1986  Entitlement to SERPS to be calculated on the basis of earnings 
over entire working life (16 to state pension age) rather than 
across the best 20 years phased in for those reaching the state 
pension age from April 2000 onwards. 
 
The accrual factor on SERPS to be reduced from 25% to 20% of 
earnings between the lower and upper earnings limits. This is to 
be phased in for those reaching the state pension age between 
April 2000 and March 2008, although accrued entitlement from 
before April 1988 is protected. 
 
Surviving partners of those who die after April 2000 to inherit 50 
percent of their spouse’s state pension instead of 100 percent. 
(This change was later put back to October 2002 after the 
Department for Social Security failed to correctly inform some 
individuals of this change, and now relates to year reached state 
pension age rather than year died). 
 
Social Security Act 1995  State pension age for women to be increased from 60 to 65 
gradually between 2010 and 2020 (by 1 month every 2 months). 
 
Technical change made to the formula used to calculate SERPS 
entitlement. This reduced the generosity of SERPS to those 
reaching the state pension age after April 1999, with both 
retrospective and prospective SERPS rights reduced. 
 
Increases in generosity of the state system: 
Child Support, Pensions and 
Social Security Act 2000 
The State Second Pension to replace SERPS from April 2002 
onwards. This is more generous to lower earners and to some 
individuals with caring responsibilities. 
Source: Attanasio, et al (2004). 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the replacement rate offered by the UK state pension system 
for men reaching the state pension age (age 65) between 1948 and 2050 who spend their 
entire working-age lives (16 to 65) in paid-employment at the (age-specific) median wage. 
Despite the fall in the generosity of the Basic State Pension relative to average earnings 
seen since 1980 the overall generosity of state pensions for this median earning 
individual, in the absence of further reforms, is found to have peaked (in terms of state 
pension as share of an individuals earnings at age 50) around the start of the 21
st Century. 
This is due to the large increase in spending on SERPS from the 1975 legislation, and the 
fact that the subsequent substantial cuts legislated in 1986 and 1995 are only being 
phased in from April 2000 and April 1999 respectively (as described in Box 2.1). The   7
increase in spending arising from the replacement of SERPS with the more generous S2P 
will, for this type of individual at least, only slow the decline in generosity of the state 
system (although lower earners and those with certain formal caring responsibilities will 
benefit more from the reform, see Disney and Emmerson (2005) for more details). 
Figure 2.3. State pension entitlement for male with median (age-specific) 























































































Notes: Calculations for individuals with full contribution history with median male age specific earnings and 
2% annual economy-wide real earnings growth.  
Source: Disney and Emmerson (2005).  
 
The next section presents changes over time in potential indicators of the well-
being of those aged 55 and over alongside the same measures among the population aged 
20 to 49.    8
3.  Data on potential indicators of the well-being of the elderly 
 
3.1 Data sources 
 
Three different sources of data have been used for the analysis contained in this 
paper. For measures of income and expenditure over time we use data from the Family 
Expenditure Survey. For information on self-reported life satisfaction we use data from the 
Eurobarometer  survey. For self-reported health status we use data from the General 
Household Survey. Table 3.1 sets out the years for which the relevant information is 
available and the overall sample sizes of those aged 55 or over.  
Table 3.1 Data sources used for information on income, expenditure, life 
satisfaction and health. 
Measure  Data source  Years available  Number of 
observations of those 
aged 55+ 
Income (both total 
and social security) 
Family Expenditure Survey  1968–2000  146,202 
Expenditure  Family Expenditure Survey  1974–2000  118,690 
Life Satisfaction  Eurobarometer  1975–1995, 
1997–2001 
20,235 
Health  General Household Survey  1975–1995, 
1997–2001 
145,605 
Source: FES, GHS and Eurobarometer surveys, various years. All surveys contain individuals of all ages.  
 
The Family Expenditure Survey (FES) is an annual survey of around 7,000 UK 
households. It has been running since 1957. Due to data discontinuities we use income 
data from 1968 onwards and expenditure data from 1974 onwards.
7 We measure income 
net of direct taxes and inclusive of all benefits, including housing benefit (which was 
introduced in April 1983. Expenditure is total household expenditure minus spending on 
housing. Data is currently available through to 2000 for both income and expenditure. 
Note that having information from before 1975 is particularly useful for the analysis 
since it allows us to include some of the period before the legislation introducing SERPS 
was passed. 
  The Eurobarometer is a survey of individuals in EU countries which is 
conducted at least twice a year and has been running since the early seventies. The annual 
sample size varies between around 2,500 and 7,000 individuals from the UK. We use the 
self-reported information on life satisfaction which is available for all years from 1975 to 
2001 with the exception of 1996 when the information is not available. The question 
                                                 
7 For information on the income and expenditure measures in the FES see Banks and Johnson, 1998.   9
asked is “On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
satisfied with the life you lead?” Unfortunately no information is available before 1975 
which means that analysis of this outcome will not include any of the period before the 
legislation introducing SERPS was passed. 
The General Household Survey (GHS), like the FES, is a survey of around 7,000 
private UK households a year. It has been running since 1971, although there was no 
survey in either 1997–98 or 1999–2000. As a result for 1997 and 1999 individuals in the 
sample will all have been interviewed in the first quarter of the calendar year, while for 
1998 and 2000 individuals will all have been interviewed in the last three quarters of the 
calendar year. The information that we use on self-reported general health status is only 
available from 1977 onwards. The question asked is “Over the last 12 months would you 
say your health has on the whole been good, fairly good, or not good?”. As with the 
information on self-reported life satisfaction no information is available before 1975 
which means that analysis of this outcome will not include any of the period before the 
legislation introducing SERPS was passed. 
Table A.1 provides some basic descriptive statistics on the number of individuals 
aged 55 and over in each of the surveys used, by year. Due to improvements in health the 
average age of individuals aged 55 and over has increased over time. For example in the 
FES it has gone from 65.8 years in 1968 to 67.9 years in 2000. This increase in longevity 
has also led to a reduction in the percentage of those aged 55 and over who are female, 
which among respondents to the FES has fallen from 55.5% in 1968 to 54.2% in 2000. 
There is also an increase in the percentage of those aged 55 and over that are outright 
owner-occupiers from 36.5% in 1968 to 58.5% in 2000. In addition to older individuals 
being more likely to own their own home outright, later cohorts in the UK have also had 
an increased propensity to be owner occupiers (the age profiles for each cohort are 
shown in section 4 of Banks and Tanner, 1999). 
3.2 Trends in potential indicators of well-being 
 
Figure 3.1a presents mean family level income (equivalised for family size) among 
those aged 55 and over (‘elderly’) and those aged 20 to 49 (‘young’) from 1968 to 2000, 
with 1968 indexed to 100. Income is measured net of taxes and inclusive of all benefits. 
The ‘young’ have higher mean incomes than the ‘elderly’, although the latter group have 
seen very slightly faster growth in their incomes over this 33 year period. In addition, as 
expected, the incomes of the ‘elderly’ are slightly less correlated with business cycle than 
the ‘young’: the latter group experienced faster growth in the economic boom of the late   10
1980s and slower growth in incomes during the recessions of the early 1980s and the 
early 1990s. However mean incomes of both groups fell during the late 1970s – for the 
‘elderly’ group this is despite the increase in the Basic State Pension during that period 
(both relative to prices and earnings as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively). 
Figure 3.1b shows information on a measure of relative income poverty over the 
same period, again with 1968 indexed to 100. The poverty measure used here is the 
percentage of individuals with family incomes below forty percent of the median family 
income of those ‘young’ in the same year – i.e. the same relative poverty line is used for 
both the ‘elderly’ and for the ‘young’ within each year. Very few individuals, ‘young’ or 
‘elderly’, fall below this relative income poverty line at the start of the period, although 
there is substantial growth in the poverty rates of both groups between 1984 and 1991.
8 
Over the whole period there is greater growth in this measure of poverty among the 
‘young’ than among the ‘elderly, with the poverty rate of the ‘young’ being above that of 
the ‘elderly’ from 1972 onwards. Unsurprisingly the poverty rate of the ‘elderly’ is far 
more cyclical than that of the ‘young’ with a particularly large increase in the poverty rate 
among the ‘elderly’ during the boom of the late 1980s and a particularly large fall during 
the recession of the early 1990s. This poverty rate among the ‘elderly’ is also observed to 
fall between 1971 and 1975 (unlike that of the young) when, as shown in Figure 2.2 and 
Figure 2.3, the value of the Basic State Pension was increased both in real terms and 
relative to average earnings.  
Figure 3.1c shows information on a measure of absolute income poverty over the 
same period, again with 1968 indexed to 100. The poverty measure is the percentage of 
individuals with incomes below forty percent of the median income of those ‘young’ in 
1968 – i.e. the same absolute poverty line is used for both the ‘elderly’ and for the ‘young’ 
throughout this period. Very few individuals, young or elderly, fall below this absolute 
income poverty line at any point during the period. 
Figure 3.1d presents information on the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentile of family 
level income (equivalised for family size) among those aged 55 and over (‘elderly’) and 
alongside information on the 50
th percentile among those aged 20 to 49 (‘young’) from 
1968 to 2000, again with 1968 indexed to 100. Over the whole period growth, among 
these groups, has been highest among the 90
th percentile of income among elderly 
families and second highest among the 50
th percentile of income among elderly families, 
                                                 
8 For more information on trends in poverty and inequality in the UK see Goodman, Johnson and Webb 
(1997) or Brewer, Goodman, Shaw and Shephard (2005).    11
with lower (and similar) growth experienced by the 10
th percentile of income among 
elderly families and the 50
th percentile of income among young families. Relative to the 
median among elderly families the 10
th percentile of family income among the elderly 
grew more strongly over the period from 1968 to 1986 and less strongly over the period 
from 1986 to 2000. Again relative to the median among elderly families the 90
th 
percentile of family income among the elder grew relatively strongly between 1986 and 
1991 and grew relatively weakly between 1991 and 1995.  
   12
Figure 3.1a Mean equivalised family income of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ individuals, 





















Source: Family Expenditure Survey, 1968 to 2000. 
 
Figure 3.1b Mean relative income poverty rates of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ 






































































































Elderly Young  Index value 100 is equal to 
€ 9,254 for elderly and

























































































Elderly Young  Index value 100 is equal to 
1.52% for elderly and
1.28% for young  13
Figure 3.1c Mean absolute income poverty rates of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ 













Source: Family Expenditure Survey, 1968 to 2000. 
Figure 3.1d 10
th percentile, median and 90
th percentile of equivalised family 
income of ‘elderly’ and median equivalised family income of ‘young’ individuals, 

























































































Index value 100 is equal to 
€ 4,550  for elderly 10th percentile
€ 7,489 for elderly median
€ 15,533 for elderly 90th percentile
€ 9,567 for young
(2001 prices)
  























































































Index value 100 is equal to 
1.52% for elderly and
1.28% for young  14
Figure 3.2a presents mean total household expenditure net of housing and equivalised 
for household size among those aged 55 and over and those aged 20 to 49 from 1974 to 
2000, with 1974 indexed to 100. As with income household expenditure of the ‘elderly’ is 
lower than that of the ‘young’ throughout the period from 1974 to 2000. Similarly 
spending grew slightly faster among the elderly (48.5%) than among the young (42.3%) 
over this period, although among both groups it grew by considerably less than the 
growth in income. As expected, changes in household expenditure over time are less 
cyclical than changes in income, with changes in household expenditure of the ‘elderly’ 
particularly smooth. Household expenditures of the ‘young’ still grow particularly quickly 
during the period of strong economic growth during the late 1980s (which at the time 
was widely believed to be a structural improvement in the economy, but this 
subsequently turned out not to be the case) and fell during the subsequent recession of 
the early 1990s. 
Figure 3.2b shows information on a measure of relative expenditure poverty over 
the same period, again with 1974 indexed to 100. The poverty measure is the percentage 
of individuals in households with expenditure below forty percent of the median 
household expenditure of those ‘young’ in the same year – i.e. the same relative 
expenditure poverty line is used for both the ‘elderly’ and for the ‘young’ within each 
year. In 1974 just 1.7% of the ‘young’ but 7.3% of the ‘elderly’ fall below this relative 
expenditure poverty line, despite having similar levels of poverty when measured using 
an income poverty line (shown in figure 3.1b). Over the period from 1974 to 2000 the 
percentage of ‘young’ below this relative expenditure poverty line increased steadily. The 
percentage of ‘elderly’ below this relative expenditure poverty line increased less over the 
whole period than that of the ‘young’, and also exhibited greater counter-cyclicality with 
declines in this measure of poverty during the recessions of the early 1980s and early 
1990s and a rise during the economic boom of the late 1980s. 
Figure 3.2c shows information on a measure of absolute expenditure poverty 
over the same period, again with 1974 indexed to 100. The poverty measure is the 
percentage of individuals in households with expenditures below forty percent of the 
median household expenditure of those ‘young’ in 1974 – i.e. the same absolute 
expenditure poverty line is used for both the ‘elderly’ and for the ‘young’ throughout this 
period. Different trends are seen for the ‘young’ and the ‘elderly’ with the former group 
experiencing an increase in the percentage falling below this absolute expenditure 
poverty measure while the latter group experiencing a fall. While in 1974 the ‘elderly’   15
were 4.2 times more likely to have household expenditure below this absolute poverty 
line than the ‘young’, by 2000 this had fallen to 1.4 times more likely. 
Figure 3.2d presents information on the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentile of 
household level expenditure (net of housing and equivalised for family size) among those 
aged 55 and over (‘elderly’) and alongside information on the 50
th percentile among those 
aged 20 to 49 (‘young’) from 1974 to 2000, again with 1974 indexed to 100. Over the 
whole period growth in median expenditure of elderly households has been very similar 
to growth in median expenditure of young households. Expenditure at the 90
th percentile 
of elderly households has grown more quickly than expenditure at the median of elderly 
households, while expenditure at the 10
th percentile of elderly households has grown less 
quickly than expenditure at the median of elderly households. In particular the period 
since 1986 has seen the 10
th percentile of expenditure among elderly households grow by 
16% in real terms which is less than half the 34% real increase in expenditure seen at the 
median. 
 
   16
Figure 3.2a Mean equivalised household expenditure of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ 













Source: Family Expenditure Survey, 1974 to 2000. 
 
Figure 3.2b Mean household relative expenditure poverty rates of ‘elderly’ and 

























































































Index value 100 is equal to 
€ 9,150 for elderly and














































































Index value 100 is equal to 
7.34% for elderly and
1.74% for young  17
Figure 3.2c Mean household absolute expenditure poverty rates of ‘elderly’ and 













Source: Family Expenditure Survey, 1974 to 2000. 
Figure 3.1d 10
th percentile, median and 90
th percentile of equivalised household 
expenditure of ‘elderly’ and median equivalised household expenditure of ‘young’ 













































































Index value 100 is equal to 
€ 3,935  for elderly 10th percentile
€ 7,437 for elderly median
€ 15,688 for elderly 90th percentile
€ 9,141 for young
(2001 prices)
 










































































Elderly Young  Index value 100 is equal to 
7.34% for elderly and
1.74% for young  18
Figure 3.3a shows the percentage of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ reporting themselves as being 
very satisfied with life from 1975 to 2001, while figure 3.3b shows the percentages who 
report themselves as being not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with life over the same 
period. In both figures 1975 is scaled to 100. At the start of this period a similar 
percentage of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ report that they are satisfied with life, although a larger 
percentage of the ‘elderly’ than the ‘young’ report that that they are not very satisfied or 
not at all satisfied. Interestingly from 1982 onwards there is an increase in the proportion 
of the ‘elderly’ who report that they are satisfied with life and a decline in the proportion 
who report they are not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with life. In contrast there is 
no apparent break in the series for the ‘young’.  
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Figure 3.3a Percentage of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ individuals who report being very 





















Source: Eurobarometer, 1975 to 1995 and 1997 to 2001. 
 
Figure 3.3b Percentage of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ individuals who report being not 


























































































Elderly - very satisfied Young - very satisfied
Index value 100 is equal to 












































































Elderly - not satisfied or not at all satisfied
Young - not satisfied or not at all satisfied
Index value 100 is equal to 
16.8% for elderly and
13.5% for young  20
Figure 3.4a shows the percentage of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ reporting themselves as 
being in good health from 1977 to 2001 (with 1997 and 1999 omitted due to data only 
being available from the 1
st quarter), while figure 3.4b shows the percentages who report 
themselves as being in not good health over the same period. In both figures 1977 is 
scaled to 100. As expected the ‘elderly’ group are less likely to report themselves as being 
in good health and more likely to report themselves as being in not good health than the 
‘young’. Comparing 1977 to 2001 among the ‘young’ there is a similar percentage point 
increase in the percentage who report themselves as being in good health as being in not 
good health – i.e. the proportion who report neither has declined. A slightly different 
pattern is observed among the ‘elderly’ with a decline in the percentage who report being 
in good health and a larger percentage point increase in the percentage who report being 
in not good health. 
 
  
   21
Figure 3.4a Percentage of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ individuals who report being in 









































































Elderly - good health Young - good health
Index value 100 is equal to 
44.2% for elderly and
67.9% for young
 
Source: General Household Survey, 1977 to 1996, 1998, 2000and 2001. 
 
Figure 3.4b Percentage of ‘elderly’ and ‘young’ individuals who do not report 









































































Elderly - not good health Young - not good health
Index value 100 is equal to 
19.3% for elderly and
6.7% for young
 
Source: General Household Survey, 1977 to 1996, 1998, 2000and 2001.   22
4.  Empirical strategy and simulated state pension entitlement 
 
4.1 Empirical strategy  
 
The amount of state pension income received by an individual in retirement is 
not necessarily the impact that it has on their retirement income. This is because changes 
to the generosity of state pension arrangements might induce individuals to change their 
behaviour in ways which also affect their retirement income. For example in the face of a 
more generous state pension system working age individuals might choose to retire 
earlier (or reduce the amount of any part-time paid employment they undertake during 
their retirement) or to consume more (i.e. save less) while working. Gruber and Wise 
(1999; 2004) present cross-country evidence that more generous state retirement benefits 
indeed induce earlier retirement. Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) examine the impact of 
the introduction of SERPS in the UK and found that middle-aged households offset 
around two-thirds of the increase in generosity of the pension system through increasing 
their consumption growth. 
One potential way around the issue outlined above is to use a regression based 
approach with income (or indeed any of the other indicators of well-being described in 
section 3.2) as the dependent variable and receipt of state pension income as a regressor. 
This would be problematic if there were unobserved characteristics that were correlated 
with both the outcome of interest for an individual and their state pension income, 
which in practice is quite likely to be the case. 
The methodology employed in this paper uses a simulated rather than actual 
measure of state pension income, which has the advantage of relying solely on policy 
decisions which change the generosity of the system. Causal inference is possible as long 
as there are no unobserved characteristics that are correlated with both outcomes in 
retirement and the reforms affecting the generosity of the state pension income. An 
example of a violation in the assumption would be an (unobserved) improvement in 
productivity that led to both an improvement in outcomes in retirement and to the 
Government choosing to enact a more generous state pension system (or to defer 
implementing a less generous one). In this case a positive correlation between the 
generosity of the state pension arrangements and the outcomes of individuals in 
retirement would be inferred wrongly.  
In our calculations we simulate two different measures of state pension 
entitlement. The first model (which we refer to as “current benefits”), calculates the   23
amount of state pension income that an individual will get in the current year given a 
distribution of possible retirement ages. So the state pension income (BA,k) received in a 
year by an individual currently aged A, born in cohort k with an earnings history ek will 
be equal to:  
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where r(a,k) is the probability that an individual from cohort k retires at age a, and 
we assume that no individual has retired before the age of 55. 
This measure of simulated state pension income only looks at current income 
from the state, and therefore does not consider either income received in the past or 
income that is expected to be received in the future. As a result individuals who are aged 
below the state pension age (currently 60 for women and 65 for men) will have zero 
current state pension income regardless of their earnings and employment history 
(though note, that as described in section 4.2 was do incorporate an estimate of receipt 
of means-tested or disability related support in the analysis). This is because in the UK, 
unlike in many other countries, receipt of state pensions is conditional solely on having 
reached the state pension age, and in addition is not conditional on labour market status. 
Furthermore reforms can, and in the case of changes to the indexation of the Basic State 
Pension do, affect the state pension income of those already in retirement. Due to these 
differences we also use a second model (which we refer to as “lifetime benefits”). This 
estimates average expected annual state pension income from ages 55 to 84, i.e: 
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where we assume that all individuals live to die at age 85. For individuals who are 
older than the age at which we are considering state pension income we use the system 
that was in place at the time. When calculating E65(b60|r58) for someone aged 65 we take 
the actual state pension income that that an individual born 65 years ago would have 
received at age 60 given they retired at 58. For individuals who are younger than the age 
at which we are considering state pension income (for example E(b60|r58) for someone 
aged 55) we would take the state pension income that that person would currently expect 
to receive at age 60 given they retired at age 58. We assume that individuals have full   24
knowledge over how current and past systems operate and that they do not anticipate 
any further reforms until they are legislated when forming these expectations. 
An important UK specific issue therefore arises with how to calculate state 
pension income for those who have chosen to contract out of SERPS. When SERPS was 
introduced in April 1978 only individuals who were not a member of an employers 
defined benefit pension plan had to join. In return for having ‘contracted out’ of SERPS 
benefits those who were in a defined benefit pension were charged a lower rate of 
National Insurance Contribution. From April 1988 individuals were also allowed to 
‘contract out’ of SERPS into an employers defined contribution pension plan (again in 
return for lower National Insurance Contributions), or an individually arranged private 
pension plan (in return for which part of the individual’s National Insurance 
Contribution would be paid into their own pension fund). Modelling retirement income 
that specifically comes from the state would require different calculations for those who 
were contracted out in a given year (who would not accrue any entitlement to SERPS in 
that year) to those who had not contracted out in a given year (who could accrue an 
entitlement to SERPS in that year). However the contracting out arrangements were 
designed so that those who contracted out of SERPS were allowed to do so on the basis 
that they would accrue a private pension that would be worth at least as much as SERPS. 
Therefore our simulations are based on the assumption that everyone is contracted into 
SERPS – which means that our simulated state pension measures will, in theory at least, 
estimate the minimum amount of pension income that individuals had to have accrued. 
This is more appropriate given that it is the impact of compulsory retirement income, 
rather than the way in which that income is financed (i.e. pay-as-you-go or funded), that 
is of primary interest in this paper.  
For both constructed measures of simulated state pension income we estimate 
two different values. The first uses the same retirement probabilities for each cohort. 
This is described as the “fully simulated” model. The second uses cohort specific 
retirement probabilities. This is described as the “partially simulated” model. For all 4 of 
these measures of simulated state pension income we use the same earnings profile, 
although, as described in section 4.2, each cohort is 2% richer than its predecessor as a 
result of our assumptions on economy-wide productivity growth.  
The measure of simulated benefits which is more appropriate to use will depend 
whether the measure of well-being being considered is influenced by past and future state 
pension income, or just by current state pension income. For example if the well-being   25
measure of interest is current income then the “current benefits” model is likely to be 
more appropriate. This is because while there are good reasons to believe that current 
state pension income might impact on current income there is less reason to believe that 
past or future state pension income will impact on current income.
9 However whether 
“current benefits” or “lifetime benefits” is the more appropriate measure when 
considering current expenditure will depend on the extent to which individuals are 
myopic or forward-looking in their expenditure choices. Similarly past or future state 
pension income could, in principle at least, affect the measures of both current life 
satisfaction and of current health. Hence in section 5 while we use the “current benefits” 
model in the analysis of the incomes of the elderly, we use both the “current benefits” 
model and the “lifetime benefits” model in the analysis of expenditure, life satisfaction 
and health. 
Before turning to the results section 4.2 provides more details of the calculation 
of both the “current benefits” and the “lifetime benefits” models while section 4.3 
highlights the extent to which the reforms to the UK pension system generate variation 
that we can exploit. 
 
4.2 Earnings and employment probabilities used in the simulations 
 
Unlike many other countries in this volume the UK does not have a long panel 
data survey of employment and earnings, nor does it typically allow access to the official 
government registers for research purposes. Hence constructing a set of individual 
earnings histories on which to base our cohort calculations is not straightforward. In all 
the calculations of simulated state pension income we use earnings profiles estimated 
from data on the same cohort of individuals drawn from successive years of our time 
series of cross sections. For those aged between 45 and 65 this is constructed using 
earnings across individuals born between 1921 and 1925 (inclusive) in the FES from 
1968 onwards. So, for example, earnings at age 45 is estimated from the earnings of 
those born between 1921 and 1925 in 1968 (and therefore actually aged between 43 and 
47 inclusive), while earnings at age 46 comes from individuals born in the same years but 
observed in the FES in 1969. As we do not have consistent FES data for years prior to 
1968 for earnings between 16 and 42 we assume that real growth in earnings for this 
cohort is the same as that observed in the FES for those born between 1951 and 1955. 
                                                 
9 Possible mechanisms do exist. First labour supply decisions could be affected by a lifetime wealth 
effect. Second, current interest or dividend income (or receipt of capital gains) could be affected by   26
These earnings are estimated separately by gender but not by education group (since we 
do not have information on educational achievement in the FES prior to 1978). For each 






th percentile of the earnings observed in the data in that year. 
Figure 4.1 shows the assumed path for median earnings, in 2001 prices, for men 
and women born in 1923. No attempt is made to control for non-random selection out 
of the labour market (i.e. the deciles of earnings are calculated only across those who are 
in paid employment). As a result this will only be the correct median earnings-profile if 
movement in and out of the labour market occurs in equal proportions among those 
who would have earned below median earnings and those who would have earned above 
the median. The lower average earnings of women is in part due to the fact that many 
women (and few men) in the UK are in part-time paid employment. For earlier and later 
cohorts we assume real earnings growth of 2% a year, which is in-line with the 
productivity growth seen on average in recent years.
10  
In order to capture further some of the non-linearities in the reforms to the state 
pension system we assume that (married and single) men and single women are in work 
from 16 through to retirement, but that married women are out of the labour market 
from age 26 to 40 (inclusive).
11 In particular this will help us to pick up the increase in 
generosity arising from the introduction of Home Responsibilities Protection (HRP, 
legislated in the Social Security Act of 1975) which meant that periods of formal caring 
(defined as earning below the Lower Earnings Level and being in receipt of certain 
benefits such as child benefit which is paid to those with a child aged 16 or under, or 
aged 17 or 18 and in full-time education) from April 1978 onwards reduce the number of 
years of contributions required to qualify for a certain level of Basic State Pension. We 
assume that from April 1978 married women qualify for HRP between the age of 26 and 
40 when they are assumed to be out of the labour market. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
individuals changing either their saving levels or investment portfolio choices. 
10 Table 1.1 of HM Treasury (2000) estimates that underlying productivity growth over the period from 
1990Q4 to 1997H1 was 2.0% a year. 
11 Many single women in the data will in fact have been previously been married. Unfortunately for 
much of the data we are not able to separate out single never married women from those who are 
widowed or divorced. While the employment histories of widowed and divorced women are more 
likely to resemble those of married women than never-married women it is far from clear that we will   27
Figure 4.1. Assumed median earnings for those born in 1923, taken from the 
median of those born between 1921 and 1925 – with a 15 year absence from the 



































































Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1968 to 1989. Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using the Retail 
Price Index from the Office for National Statistics 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
For the “fully simulated” estimates of state pension income we use retirement 
probabilities constructed from data on those born between 1922 and 1924 (inclusive). 
The percentage of this central cohort ‘retired’ (as defined by not currently being in 
employment or self-employment) at each age is shown in figure 4.2. A large increase in 
the proportion not in paid employment is observed at the respective state pension ages 
for women (60) and men (65). Despite this the majority of men and women are out of 
the labour market before they reach the state pension age – 53% of women in this cohort 
were retired at age 59 and 63% of men were retired at age 64. For the purposes of the 
simulations we assume that no-one is retired before the age of 55 and then take the 
probability of retiring at any age as being the difference between the percentage retired at 
that age and the percentage retired at the previous age.
12 From the state pension age and 
beyond we set the retirement probability to be 1.0 (and therefore the probability of 
retiring after the state pension age to be zero) – since even those who are still in paid 
                                                                                                                                          
be over-estimating state pension receipt since in practice many of these women will be receiving state 
pensions on the basis of the contributions made by their deceased or divorced partner.  
12 In the small number of cases where this would lead to a negative value we change the probability of 
being retired to be the same as that at one year earlier.   28
employment can receive state pension benefits, and no further entitlement to SERPS can 
be accrued through remaining in employment after the state pension age. 
Figure 4.2. Average retirement probabilities for those born between 1922 and 1924 






























Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1968 to 2000.  
 
For the “partially simulated” estimates we allow the retirement probabilities to 
vary across cohorts. For some cohorts we only have partial information on the true 
retirement outcomes since retirement probabilities at some ages (either young ages for 
the older cohorts or older ages for the younger ages) are not observed in the time span of 
our data. For these cohorts, for the retirement probabilities that we do not observe, we 
assume the change in retirement probability between ages was the same as seen in the 
most recent cohort for which we do have information. 
The extent to which the “fully simulated” and the “partially simulated” estimates 
vary will depend on whether retirement probabilities have been changing across cohorts 
(and the extent to which state pension benefits depend on an individuals retirement age, 
which will be stronger when considering periods where individuals are able to accrue an 
entitlement to SERPS) Figure 4.3 gives some indication of this by showing the 
percentage of men and women aged 60 who are not in paid employment by year of birth. 
For men a trend towards earlier retirement is apparent, with later year of birth cohorts 
having a larger percentage of individuals out of the labour market at age 60. In contrast 
the percentage of women out of the labour market at age 60 has not exhibited any trend 
increase or decline over the period, perhaps suggesting that cohort effects (the increased   29
labour market attachment among women born later) and time effects (the fall in 
employment rates seen among older men between 1975 and 1995) have broadly 
cancelled out.  


























































































































































Source: Family Expenditure Survey 1968 to 2000.  
 
As shown in figure 4.2 a large proportion of individuals in the UK have left the 
labour market before they reach the state pension age. While unable to receive state 
pension income in practice many qualify for either income-tested or health-related 
support for the Government such as Income Support or Invalidity/Incapacity Benefit.
13 
While modelling entitlements to these benefits is difficult to do accurately, ignoring them 
would mean that assuming individuals retiring before the state pension age have no social 
security income. Therefore we attempt to take this into account by giving those who 
retire before they reach the state pension age state benefit income equal to 50% of the 
Basic State Pension. Under the (not unrealistic) assumption that half of early retirees 
qualify for either Income Support or Invalidity/Incapacity Benefit (both of which are set 
at a value not too dissimilar to the full Basic State Pension) on average this should not be 
too inaccurate. 
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4.3 Simulated state pension entitlements 
 
Using the earnings and retirement profiles set out above, and the rules 
determining eligibility for state pension income, we calculate the simulated state pension 
estimates under the “current benefits” and the “lifetime benefits” methodology set out 
above. These simulated benefits are then allocated to individuals on the basis of their 
year of birth and whether they are a man, a single woman or a married woman. This 
gives nine values of simulated benefits for each individual (corresponding to the nine 
decile points of the earnings distribution (which as set out in section 4.2 also varies by 
whether a man, a single woman or a married woman)). We then attribute four values of 
simulated benefits to each individual: those corresponding to the 10
th, the 50
th and the 
90
th percentiles of the earnings distribution and one which corresponds to the mean of 
the nine decile points. We then sum each of these simulated state pension incomes across 
individuals within a family and equivalise to get four measures of simulated family state 




and the mean of the nine decile points). This is done for each of the four measures of 
simulated state pension income (i.e. both “fully simulated” and “partially simulated” 
estimates of “current benefits” and the “lifetime benefits”). We then collapse all of the 
data (containing both benefits and different potential indicators of well-being) into age 
by year of birth cells.  
Figure 4.4a takes the estimates obtained by taking the mean of the nine decile 
points of simulated benefits using the “current benefits” methodology and plots these 
against current family income. As expected the simulated state pension income for those 
aged 50 is very low (no individual is assumed to retire before age 55), although not 
precisely zero since some of the non-retired individuals will be married to someone who 
is older and retired (and is therefore in receipt of either our estimate of their state 
pension entitlement if they are over the state pension age or our estimate of means-tested 
or disability related support if they are aged between 55 and the state pension age). At 
older ages there is a much clearer positive correlation between simulated state pension 
income and current total income. The correlation between the two series is closer to 1 
for those aged 65 and over (i.e. a line of best fit would have a slope closer to that of the 
45 degree line). 
 
                                                                                                                                          
13 See, for example, Blundell and Johnson (1998).    31
Figure 4.4a. Equivalised family level fully-simulated state pension benefits, 








0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 10,000











































) 50 55 60 65 70
45 degree line
 
Source: Family income from Family Expenditure Survey 1968 to 2000. Figures uprated to June 2001 prices 
using the Retail Price Index from the Office for National Statistics 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
Figure 4.4b shows the equivalent estimates for the “lifetime benefits” 
methodology. Since this is actual or expected state pension income between the ages of 
55 an 84 it is never zero, even for those aged 50 who by assumption have not yet retired. 
For this reason the average values of this measure of simulated benefits are much higher 
than those for “current benefits” shown in figure 4.4a.    32
Figure 4.4b. Equivalised family level fully-simulated state pension benefits, “past 
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Source: Family income from Family Expenditure Survey 1968 to 2000. Figures uprated to June 2001 prices 
using the Retail Price Index from the Office for National Statistics 
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
Figure 4.5a plots both partially and full-simulated “current benefits” for those 
aged 65 and over from 1968 to 2000. There is very little difference between the fully and 
partially simulated benefit receipt lines. This mainly reflects the fact that SERPS was only 
introduced in April 1978 and that individuals had to have made contributions during 
their working lives to be entitled – so that even by the late 1980s many of those in 
retirement would not have been entitled to any SERPS. Furthermore for women at least, 
as shown in figure 4.3, there is no trend towards earlier or later retirement over the 
period (and differences between the fully and partially simulated methodologies will only 
arise if there are differences in retirement ages by year of birth).  
Also shown in Figure 4.5a are three other measures of transfer payments from 
the state. Income from state pensions and also total income from the state (which also 
includes other income related and health contingent benefits for example Income 
Support, Housing Benefit, Invalidity Benefit and Incapacity Benefit and Council Tax 
Benefits) are taken from the FES. In addition the figure contains a series constructed 
from administrational data on total state pension spending and the number of individuals   33
aged over the state pension age. Note that while the former series is constructed in the 
same way as our simulated benefit series (i.e. it is for individuals aged 65 and over, and 
incomes are equivalised in the same way) the series from administrational data includes 
women aged 60 to 64 and, more importantly, implicitly uses an equivalence scale of 2.0 
for couples. 
Both the simulated “current benefits” series are found to track the state pension 
series from the FES relatively closely, with the correlation co-efficient between actual 
benefits and fully simulated benefits being 0.977 while the correlation co-efficient 
between actual benefits and partially simulated benefits it is 0.980. The series of state 
pension income from administrational data sources, while being at a lower level due to 
the different equivalence scale implicitly being used, also tracks both the simulated 
benefit series relatively closely (correlation co-efficients of 0.928 and 0.934 for fully and 
partially simulated benefits respectively). From around 1990 onwards it is noticeable that 
both the simulated series increase more quickly than either state pension income from 
the FES or from administrational data. This is probably due to the role of contracting 
out with part of compulsory pension income (which, as described in section 4.1, is 
essentially what is being modelled with the simulated benefits series) not appearing as 
state pension income in retirement but instead as income from private sources. 
Unfortunately neither the FES nor administrational data allows us to calculate a measure 
of income that includes that from contracted-out pensions that substitute for state 
pensions. The total benefit income series, while being at a higher level (due to the 
inclusion of other transfer payments), also tracks the two simulated benefit series 
relatively closely.    34
Figure 4.5a. Fully and partially simulated “Current benefits” model and actual 












































































































































































































Total benefit income (FES)
Total state pension (FES)
Total state pension (admin)
 
Source: ‘Total benefit income (FES)’ and ‘Total state pension (FES)’ from Family Expenditure Survey 
1968 to 2000; Actual benefits (admin) calculated using figures on total state pension expenditure from the 
Department for Work and Pensions and figures on the population aged at the state pension age and above. 
Note that this latter series includes women aged 60 to 64 and implicitly uses an equivalence scale of 1.0 for 
each pensioner in a pensioner couple. Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using the Retail Price Index 
from the Office for National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and 
converted to Euros using an exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
Figure 4.5b plots both partially and fully-simulated “lifetime benefits” alongside 
the two FES series on income from state transfers for those aged 55 and over and the 
same series from administrational as shown in figure 4.5a, again from 1968 to 2000. 
Again there is little difference between the partially and fully simulated models (although 
the divergence caused by the introduction of SERPS is observed ‘earlier’ as individuals 
are looking forwards to the state pension they will receive in the future). It is clear that 
the “lifetime benefits” model is not as highly corrected with the state pension income 
series from the FES as the “current benefits” model shown in figure 4.5a. The 
correlation co-efficient between both fully simulated benefits and partially simulated 
benefits with this series is 0.941. As discussion in section 4.1 this is not surprising. For 
example the drop in “lifetime benefits” in 1981 is caused by the announced change in 
planned indexation which will actually have led to declining social security benefit receipt 
over time rather than a one-off decline.   35
Figure 4.5b. Fully and partially simulated “Lifetime benefits” model and actual 
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Source: ‘Total benefit income (FES)’ and ‘Total state pension (FES)’ from Family Expenditure Survey 
1968 to 2000; Actual benefits (admin) calculated using figures on total state pension expenditure from the 
Department for Work and Pensions and figures on the population aged at the state pension age and above. 
Note that this latter series includes women aged 60 to 64 and implicitly uses an equivalence scale of 1.0 for 
each pensioner in a pensioner couple. Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using the Retail Price Index 
from the Office for National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and 
converted to Euros using an exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
Variation in the fully-simulated “current benefits” model is shown for selected 
cohorts across time in figure 4.6a. For simplicity we show fully simulated benefits for 
single men as this enables the impact of the reforms to be highlighted more cleanly.
14 
Benefits are zero before age 55 (as by assumption no-one has retired). At the age of 55 
they jump to be equal to half of the value of the Basic State Pension. At age 65 “current 
benefits” jump again to be equal to estimated entitlement to both the Basic State Pension 
and SERPS. The height of this jump at age 65 varies across cohorts since their SERPS 
entitlements depends on years of contributions made since April 1978. Hence both the 
1898 and 1908 cohorts have no entitlements, while the 1918 cohort have a small SERPS 
entitlement and the 1928 cohort a larger SERPS entitlement. It should be noted that in 
the regression analysis of this model in section 5 we restrict the sample to those aged 55 
and over only, which restricts the analysis to the amount of variation presented in figure 
4.6b (which is still considerable). 
                                                 
14 This will miss out the additional variation created by the introduction of HRP (from April 1978) 
which benefits married women. Note though that under the assumption married women qualify for   36
Figure 4.6a. Variation in full-simulated “Current benefits” model explaining 















































































































































































































Source: Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using the Retail Price Index from the Office for National 
Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
Figure 4.6b. Variation in full-simulated “Current benefits” model explaining 















































































































































































































Source: Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using the Retail Price Index from the Office for National 
Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
                                                                                                                                          
HRP between the ages of 26 and 40 the first women to receive additional state pension income from 
this will have been 39 in 1978 and therefore will not reach the state pension age of 60 until 1999.   37
Variation in the fully-simulated “lifetime benefits” model is shown for selected 
cohorts across time in figure 4.7a. Again for simplicity we show fully simulated benefits 
for single men in order to highlight the impact of reforms more cleanly.
15 Prior to 1975 
(i.e. before the introduction of SERPS) successive cohorts expect higher Basic State 
Pension entitlement due to it being indexed in line with average earnings. In 1975 
expected entitlements jump due to the introduction of SERPS, with the size of the 
increase varying by year of birth since this affects the amount of contributions that will 
be made post April 1978. In 1980 expected state pension income is reduced as 
individuals now expect the Basic State Pension to be indexed in line with prices and not 
earnings. Losses from this reform are greater for individuals born later since they will 
have lost more years of earnings indexation before they die. Of the cohorts shown in the 
figure the impact of the 1986 cut can be seen to only affect those born in 1938, and they 
also lose from the 1995 reform although this has a smaller impact. Again while this might 
appear to be a considerable amount of variation it should be noted that in the regression 
analysis of this model in section 5 we restrict the sample to those aged 55 and over only. 
This restricts the analysis (considerably) to the amount of variation presented in figure 
4.7b. 
We now turn to section 5 which presents the results.  
  
                                                 
15 Again this will miss out on the additional variation caused by the introduction of HRP which was 
legislated in 1975. Hence married women who are between the ages of 25 and 40 after April 1978 
(when HRP started to be given) will, by assumption, receive a larger increase in their expected state 
pension in 1975.   38
Figure 4.7a. Variation in full-simulated “Lifetime benefits” model explaining 











































































































































































































Source: Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using the Retail Price Index from the Office for National 
Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63. 
 
Figure 4.7b. Variation in full-simulated “Lifetime benefits” model explaining 











































































































































































































Source: Figures uprated to June 2001 prices using the Retail Price Index from the Office for National 
Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/1750CPI.pdf), and converted to Euros using an 
exchange rate of £1 = €1.63.   39
5. Results 
 
We now turn to the results of the multivariate analysis which attempts to pin 
down the causal impact of changes in the generosity of state pension arrangements on 
the various outcomes of interest. Section 5.1 presents the results from the “current 
benefits” measure of state pension generosity while section 5.2 presents the results from 
the “lifetime benefits” approach.  
5.1 “Current benefits” 
 
Since the “current benefits” measure is, as expected, positively correlated with 
actual state pension income, in the main analysis that follows we use this as an 
instrument to examine the exogenous impact of increased state pension income on the 
various outcomes of interest. 
The precise measure of both actual and simulated state pension income that we 
use varies with the particular outcome of interest. In total we use four different measures 
of actual state pension income and four different measures of simulated state pension 
income to examine the impact of state pensions on sixteen different outcomes of 
interest. These are set out in Table 5.1. When examining the mean level of total income, 
the mean level of total expenditure, and reported levels of life satisfaction or health we 
use the mean level of actual state pension income as the right hand side variable of 
interest. This is instrumented by taking mean “current benefits” from the nine decile 
points of the earnings distribution as described in Section 4.3. For the other outcomes of 
interest we take both actual and simulated benefits from more relevant parts of the 
income distribution. So, for example, when examining the impact of state pensions on 
the incomes of those at the 10
th percentile of the income distribution we take the mean 
level of state pension income observed among those between the 5
th and the 15
th 
percentile of the income distribution. This is instrumented using the “current benefits” 
measure of simulated benefits for an individual at the 10
th percentile of the earnings 
distribution. 
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Table 5.1 Well-being outcomes examined and the specific measure of actual 
benefits and instrument used in each case. 
Well-being measure  Actual benefits measure  “Current benefits” instrument
   
Mean income 
Mean expenditure 
% very satisfied 
% unsatisfied 
% good health 
% poor health 
Mean state pension income 
Mean simulated benefits from 
9 decile points of earnings 
distribution 
   
   
Median income 
Median expenditure 
Mean state pension income of 
those between 45th and 55th 
percentile of income 
distribution 
Simulated benefits of median 
earner 
   
   
10th percentile of income 
Relative income poverty 
Absolute income poverty 
10th percentile of expenditure 
Relative expenditure poverty 
Absolute expenditure poverty 
Mean state pension income of 
those between 5th and 15th 
percentile of income 
distribution 
Simulated benefits from 10th 
percentile of earnings 
distribution 
   
   
90th percentile of income 
90th percentile of expenditure 
Mean state pension income of 
those between 85th and 95th 
percentile of income 
distribution 
Simulated benefits from 90th 
percentile of earnings 
distribution 
    
 
 
The first stage results – i.e. from the regressions with the specific measure of 
actual benefits as the dependent variable and the relevant instrument (along with a set of 
controls) on the right hand side – are presented in Table 5.2a. As expected in each of 
these cases higher levels of simulated “current benefits” are associated with higher levels 
of actual state pension income. In each case we find that a slightly stronger correlation 
between the simulated benefits measure and actual state pension income when using the 
fully simulated methodology than when we apply the partially simulated methodology. 
This is consistent with the idea that increases (reductions) in the generosity of state 
pension arrangements lead to individuals retiring earlier (later) and therefore slightly 
reducing (increasing) the level of state pension to which they are entitled. 
The other finding of note is that we find a much stronger correlation when 
examining the state pension income of those on lower incomes (co-efficients of 1.085 
and 1.009 for the partially and fully simulated methodologies respectively) than when we   41
look at state pension incomes of those further up the income distribution. This is not 
surprising as higher earners were more likely to contract out of SERPS than lower 
earners. Therefore, as discussed in section 4.1, the simulated “current benefits” 
methodology (which includes all mandatory pension income in retirement) would be 
expected to be less correlated with state pension income (which does not include 
mandatory pension income from private sources).  
 
Table 5.2a First stage regression results – ‘current benefits’ model. 
 Dependent  variable  Mean of 
dependent 
variable 





       
1)  Mean state pension income  3,584  0.517  0.469 
     (0.013) (0.012) 
       
2)  Mean state pension income for the 5th to the   3,856  1.085  1.009 
 15th percentile of the income distribution    (0.049) (0.046) 
       
3)  Mean state pension income for the 45th to the   3,635  0.440  0.402 
 55th percentile of the income distribution    (0.021) (0.020) 
       
4)  Mean state pension income for the 85th to the   3,322  0.455  0.422 
 95th percentile of the income distribution    (0.013) (0.012) 
Note: Number of observations = 1,398. Controls for the percentage of the cohort who are male and the 
percentage of the cohort who are married and a full set of year and age dummies also included. Age and 
year cells weighted to take into account the number of individuals in each cell. In each equation the key 
dependent variable is: (1) the mean of the simulated state pension entitlement from each of the nine decile 
points of the earnings distribution; (2) the simulated state pension entitlement for an individual at the 10th 
percentile; (3) the simulated state pension entitlement for an individual at the 50th percentile; and (4) the 
simulated state pension entitlement for an individual at the 90th percentile. 
 
The measured effect of changes in state pension income on each of the sixteen 
outcomes of interest is presented in Table 5.2b. The “reduced form” column presents 
the co-efficient of interest from analysis where the outcome of interest is regressed on 
the relevant “current benefits” measure of simulated state pension income. This is done 
for both the partially and the fully simulated measures of benefits. The “IV” column 
presents the results from an equivalent set of regressions where the relevant measure of 
actual benefits is included on the right hand side, but instrumented with the relevant   42
measure of “current benefits” using the first stage regression results reported in Table 
5.2a.
16 
Table 5.2b Reduced form and IV regression results – ‘current benefits’ model. 
     Reduced form  IV 








        
Income        
Mean   €12,489  1,398 0.133 0.122 0.258 0.259 
     (0.067) (0.062) (0.130) (0.133) 
Relative povertya  2.1%  1,398  –0.019 –0.018 –0.017 –0.018 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Absolute povertya  0.7%  1,398  –0.006 –0.005 –0.005 –0.005 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
10th percentile   €6,409  1,398 0.959 0.886 0.884 0.878 
     (0.074) (0.069) (0.079) (0.079) 
Median   €10,585  1,398 0.311 0.287 0.708 0.715 
     (0.052) (0.048) (0.126) (0.128) 
90th percentile   €20,212 1,398  –0.050 –0.038 –0.109 –0.091 
     (0.091) (0.085) (0.199) (0.201) 
        
Expenditure        
Mean   €10,572  1,154 0.470 0.428 1.053 1.063 
     (0.083) (0.076) (0.190) (0.194) 
Relative povertya  9.4%  1,154  –0.019 –0.018 –0.017 –0.018 
     (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Absolute povertya  5.8% 1,154 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
10th percentile   €4,577  1,154 0.328 0.280 0.292 0.283 
     (0.145) (0.130) (0.129) (0.132) 
Median  €8,492  1,154 0.375 0.341 1.030 1.035 
     (0.071) (0.065) (0.205) (0.208) 
90th percentile   €18,267  1,154 0.401 0.372 1.021 1.024 
     (0.117) (0.108) (0.298) (0.300) 
        
Life satisfaction        
Very satisfieda  36.1%  896  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
     (0.011) (0.010) (0.026) (0.027) 
Unsatisfieda  13.5%  896  –0.011 –0.009 –0.024 –0.024 
     (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) 
        
Health        
Good healtha  43.6%  996  0.009 0.009 0.021 0.022 
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
Poor healtha  20.8%  996  –0.004 –0.004 –0.010 –0.011 
     (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Note: 
aDummy variables are multiplied by 1,000 for regression results but not for reported means; 
Controls for the percentage of the cohort who are male and the percentage of the cohort who are married 
and a full set of year and age dummies also included. Age and year cells weighted to take into account the 
number of individuals in each cell. Figures in € are Euros per year in 2001 prices.  
                                                 
16 For expenditure, life satisfaction and health the first stage regression differs from that reported in 
Table 5.2a since the first stage is estimated across only the periods for which outcome data is available. 
See Table 3.1 for more details.   43
The reduced form and the IV estimates suggest that increased state pension 
entitlements increase net retirement incomes and reduce both relative and absolute 
income poverty. There is also some evidence that the impact of increased state pension 
entitlements on actual retirement income is higher at the median and the 10
th percentile 
of the income distribution than it is for either mean incomes or the incomes of those at 
the 90
th percentile of the income distribution. This is consistent with the idea that those 
who are further up the income distribution are more able to offset changes in the 
generosity of state pensions – for example by increasing consumption during working 
life. The potential bias introduced by the contracting out arrangements strengthens this 
finding since this will tend to bias upwards the magnitude of the IV estimates with a 
bigger bias for higher earners since these are more likely to have been contracted out. 
The co-efficients on relative and absolute income poverty appear to be of a reasonable 
magnitude: they imply that €1,000 a year (in 2001 prices) additional state pension income 
would reduce relative income poverty by around 1.8ppt and absolute income poverty by 
0.5ppt.  
Turning to the estimates for expenditure the results suggest that increased state 
pensions lead to increases in mean retirement expenditure and reduces relative 
expenditure poverty, although there is no evidence of a reduction in absolute expenditure 
poverty. The estimated impact on relative expenditure poverty is the same as the 
estimated impact on relative income poverty (€1,000 of state pension income reducing 
poverty by 1.8ppt). The estimated impacts on expenditure at different parts of the 
distribution are somewhat surprising since they imply a larger impact on spending at the 
top of the expenditure distribution than at the bottom of the expenditure distribution. 
This could be due to those individuals who were still in work choosing to save more in 
response to cuts to state pensions – so we might not observe a change in their current 
income but could observe a reduction in their current spending. Another possibility is 
that the impact of a reform on current state pension income could be much smaller than 
the impact on future state pension income, which could rationally lead to larger changes 
in current expenditure than in current income. The obvious example of a reform of this 
type is the 1980 reform to index state pensions in line with inflation rather than in line 
with the greater of growth in prices or earnings. An alternative explanation is that the 
impacts at different parts of the income and expenditure distribution might not be the 
same since they are not the same individuals. This is explored further in Table 5.3. The   44
final two panels of Table 5.2b suggest that, if anything, increases in State Pensions lead to 
both increased reported life satisfaction and increased reported health.  
Further evidence on the impact of state pensions on the income and expenditure of 
individuals at different parts of the income and expenditure distribution are presented 
in Table 5.3. This looks at the mean of income and expenditure among individuals 
taken from different parts of the income distribution to ensure that comparisons are 
made between the same individuals. As was the case in Table 5.2b the estimated 
impact on income on those towards the bottom of the income distribution are larger 
than those around the middle of the distribution, and there is no statistically 
significant effect on the income of those towards the top of the income distribution.  
For expenditure a slight puzzle remains. As we would expect the estimated 
impacts on spending are very similar to those for income among individuals towards the 
bottom of the income distribution. However there is still some evidence that the 
expenditure of those towards the top of the income distribution is affected by state 
pensions, despite their income not being affected. Again this could be due to younger 
individuals who are in work choosing to save more to compensate for lower state 
pensions, which would have no impact on their current income but would reduce their 
current expenditure. Alternatively it could be that reforms which changed the growth 
rate of future benefits might be expected to only have a small impact on current income 
but could have a large impact on future income and therefore potentially on the 
appropriate level of expenditure.   45
Table 5.3 Reduced form and IV regression results – ‘current benefits’ model: 
estimated impact on income and expenditure at different parts of the income 
distribution.  
     Reduced form 




       
15th to 25th pctile of the income distribution    
Mean income  €7,481 1,398  0.809  0.744 
     (0.037) (0.034) 
Mean expenditure   €7,362 1,154  0.896  0.806 
     (0.122) (0.110) 
        
45th to 55th pctile of the income distribution    
Mean income  €10,567 1,398  0.279  0.258 
     (0.033) (0.031) 
Mean expenditure   €9,308 1,154  0.488  0.522 
     (0.072) (0.079) 
        
75th to 85th pctile of the income distribution    
Mean income  €15,802 1,398  –0.048  –0.042 
     (0.038) (0.035) 
Mean expenditure   €12,893 1,154  0.525  0.485 
     (0.073) (0.068) 
       
Note: Controls for the percentage of the cohort who are male and the percentage of the cohort who are 
married and a full set of year and age dummies also included. Age and year cells weighted to take into 
account the number of individuals in each cell. Figures in € are Euros per year in 2001 prices.  
 
5.2  “Lifetime benefits” 
 
The reduced form results from the “lifetime benefits” model are reported for 
those aged 55 and over in Table 5.4a. The magnitude of the co-efficients here are more 
difficult to interpret since they are sensitive to how past and future benefit entitlement is 
discounted. In these calculations presented below, for simplicity, we give equal weight to 
past and future state pension payments (i.e. no discounting). Since future entitlements to 
state pension might be worth less than current entitlements Table 5.4b presents results 
from examining just those aged 65 and over. As was the case for the “current benefits” 
methodology in all of the results we find marginally larger co-efficients on the “partially 
simulated” model than in the “fully simulated model”.    46
Table 5.4a Reduced form results – ‘lifetime benefits’ – all 55 and over 
Dependent variable  Mean  Obs  Partially 
simulated 
Fully simulated 
      
Expenditure     
Mean   €10,572 1,154  0.340  0.340 
     (0.151) (0.143) 
Relative povertya  9.4% 1,154 0.005 0.004 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
Absolute povertya  5.8% 1,154  –0.011  –0.010 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
10th percentile   €4,577 1,154  0.098  0.092 
     (0.116) (0.119) 
Median  €8,492 1,154  0.234  0.223 
     (0.122) (0.117) 
90th percentile   €18,267 1,154  0.289  0.265 
     (0.226) (0.205) 
      
Life satisfaction      
Very satisfieda  36.1% 896 0.034 0.033 
     (0.021) (0.020) 
Unsatisfieda  13.5% 896 –0.012  –0.009 
     (0.015) (0.014) 
      
Health      
Good healtha  43.6% 996 –0.004  –0.001 
     (0.007) (0.007) 
Poor healtha  20.8% 996 0.010 0.009 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
Note: 
aDummy variables are multiplied by 1,000 for regression results but not for reported means; 
Controls for the percentage of the cohort who are male and the percentage of the cohort who are married 
and a full set of year and age dummies also included. Age and year cells weighted to take into account the 
number of individuals in each cell. Figures in € are Euros per year in 2001 prices. 
 
For both those aged 55 and over and those aged 65 and over we find evidence 
that increases in the generosity of state pensions lead to increased expenditure by the 
elderly. There is also some evidence that the impact is larger for those aged 65 and over 
than it is for those aged 55 and over. There is no statistically significant evidence of 
changes in this measure of the generosity of state pensions affecting expenditure poverty. 
Similarly we find no statistically significant evidence of any effect of this measure of state 
pensions on either life satisfaction or health – although the co-efficients on life 
satisfaction for both those aged 55 and over and those aged 65 and over have the 
expected signs. 
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Table 5.4b Reduced form results – ‘lifetime benefits’ – all 65 and over 
Dependent variable  Mean  Obs  Partially 
simulated 
Fully simulated 
      
Expenditure     
Mean   €9,001 884  0.559 0.552 
     (0.248 (0.231) 
Relative povertya  13.5% 884 0.012 0.004 
     (0.013) (0.006) 
Absolute povertya  8.6% 884  –0.013  –0.011 
     (0.011) (0.011) 
10th percentile   €3,997 884  0.039 0.055 
     (0.253) (0.254) 
Median  €7,119 884  0.318 0.357 
     (0.210) (0.197) 
90th percentile   €15,620 884  0.984  0.884 
     (0.387) (0.349) 
      
Life satisfaction      
Very satisfieda  37.9% 646 0.039 0.037 
     (0.037) (0.034) 
Unsatisfieda  12.6% 646 –0.024  –0.020 
     (0.025) (0.024) 
      
Health      
Good healtha  38.9% 756 0.007 0.007 
     (0.012) (0.012) 
Poor healtha  22.9% 756 0.014 0.013 
     (0.011) (0.010) 
Note: 
aDummy variables are multiplied by 1,000 for regression results but not for reported means; 
Controls for the percentage of the cohort who are male and the percentage of the cohort who are married 
and a full set of year and age dummies also included. Age and year cells weighted to take into account the 
number of individuals in each cell. Figures in € are Euros per year in 2001 prices. 
 




This paper has presented the trends seen over the last quarter of the 20th 
Century in various indicators of the well-being of the elderly – both the level and 
distribution of income and expenditure, and self-reported measures of life satisfaction 
and health – alongside those seen for the young. Two methods of calculating the effects 
of pension reforms are utilised. One is similar to the analysis in the other chapters of this 
volume and calculates the effects of reform on state pension income in the first year of 
retirement. The second takes a different perspective and looks at the change in the 
present discounted of the future stream of lifetime benefits that arises from the reform, 
which one might expect to be a more relevant variable for consumption in particular. 
The frequent and often substantial reforms to the UK pension system over this 
period provide large variation in individuals’ state pension incomes that varies by age, 
year and cohort. Using this variation, and taking into account both age and year effects, 
increases in the generosity of state pensions can be seen to have led to increased incomes 
of the elderly and reductions in measures of both relative and absolute income poverty. 
State pensions have led to increased levels of consumption expenditures by the elderly. 
The fact that these reforms have affected the outcomes of the elderly – rather 
than being fully offset by changing savings behaviour of individuals prior to retirement, 
or changes in retirement decisions – is not surprising for two reasons. First, and perhaps 
most crucially, often very little (pre-retirement) notice was given. Second some of the 
reforms were substantial and, as shown by Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), who looked 
at contemporaneous consumption changes at the time of the reform, full offset did not 
take place. The clearest example of both of these facts is the move to index state 
pensions in payment to growth in prices rather than to the greater of growth in prices or 
earnings. This came into action from November 1980 and yet was only legislated for 
earlier that same year and represented a large cut in the generosity of state pensions for 
many individuals who had already moved out of the labour market.  
Our estimates of the responsiveness of retirement incomes and retirement 
expenditure to changes in the generosity of state pensions appear to be most consistent 
at the median of the income and expenditure distribution: our fully-simulated, 
instrumental variables, estimate for the impact of a 1 unit increase in state pensions is to 
boost retirement incomes by 0.715 units and retirement expenditure by 1.035 units, with 
standard errors of 0.128 and 0.208 respectively.   49
Around the tails of the income distribution the results for the effects on income 
and expenditure are less consistent with each other. At the 10
th percentile of the income 
distribution this seems to be explained by individuals with temporarily low incomes – our 
analysis of those between the 15
th and the 25
th percentile of the income distribution (i.e. 
those slightly further up the income distribution) suggests a similar impact of state 
pension reforms on both retirement incomes and retirement expenditure. This in turn 
suggests that not only did these low income individuals not have time to offset the 
impact of these reforms fully, but that their expenditure also, to some extent at least, 
tracks their income. For those towards the top of the income distribution our estimates 
suggest that state pension reforms have had little impact on retirement incomes. 
Somewhat surprisingly though there is a detectable impact on expenditure for those at 
the top of the income and consumption distributions. We leave this puzzle for future 
research. 
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Table A.1 Annual sample sizes and basic summary statistics from FES, 
Eurobarometer and GHS surveys, those aged 55 and over only. 























1968  65.8 55.5  36.5  4,679 n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a 
1969  66.0 55.5  35.8  4,644 n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a 
1970  65.9 55.4  35.7  4,181 n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a 
1971  66.2 56.3  35.5  4,778 n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a 
1972  66.1 55.4  35.4  4,470 n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a 
1973  66.5 55.5  37.0  4,760 n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a 
1974  66.8 55.6  37.8  4,360 n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a  n/a 
1975  66.8 56.3  38.5  4,630 65.5 55.6  825  n/a n/a  n/a 
1976  66.7 56.0  39.2  4,818 65.6 54.8  755  n/a n/a  n/a 
1977  66.7 56.7  38.2  4,757 66.0 55.4  816  66.8 57.4 7,871 
1978  66.7 56.2  39.6  4,554 65.5 54.2  810  66.8 57.8 7,698 
1979  67.0 56.3  39.3  4,397 66.2 54.0  378  66.9 57.0 7,506 
1980  66.8 56.3  39.7  4,484 66.0 53.4  423  66.8 57.6 7,721 
1981  66.8 56.0  40.6  4,927 65.6 54.3  414  67.0 57.0 7,804 
1982  66.9 55.1  40.3  4,697 66.6 53.1  754  67.2 57.0 6,906 
1983  67.1 56.3  44.8  4,450 66.2 52.8  795  67.3 57.3 6,735 
1984  67.0 55.2  42.8  4,659 66.7 52.9  820  67.8 56.9 6,219 
1985  67.2 55.3  43.0  4,495 66.7 50.2  885  67.4 56.8 6,297 
1986  67.4 55.8  43.5  4,504 66.7 50.8  835  67.6 57.0 6,485 
1987  67.4 55.8  46.0  4,637 67.1 48.6  743  67.6 56.7 6,499 
1988  67.7 54.3  48.0  4,572 67.3 52.8  405  68.2 56.7 4,894 
1989  67.5 54.8  50.7  4,634 67.8 52.9 1,481 67.9 55.9 6,269 
1990  67.9 54.6  49.0  4,390 67.2 55.5 1,252 67.9 55.9 6,033 
1991  68.1 55.9  49.5  4,362 67.3 55.7  849  68.0 55.6 6,136 
1992  67.9 54.8  51.3  4,510 66.8 55.5 1,676 68.2 55.2 6,160 
1993  68.0 54.6  53.0  4,258 66.8 54.8  838  68.3 56.1 6,022 
1994  68.2 55.0  51.4  4,115 67.3 53.3  836  68.4 56.2 5,760 
1995  68.3 54.9  51.8  3,970 66.8 53.9  419  68.3 55.6 5,742 
1996  68.4 54.4  52.6  3,746 n/a n/a  n/a  68.4 55.0 5,391 
1997  68.4 53.6  53.4  3,688 67.0 48.3  379  68.2 55.2 1,375 
1998  67.9 53.5  56.0  3,812 66.6 50.4  387  68.3 54.9 3,790 
1999  68.0 53.9  53.4  4,148 67.7 48.7  809  68.0 54.9 1,278 
2000  67.9 54.2  58.5  4,116 66.9 48.8  846  68.0 53.4 3,606 
2001  n/a n/a  n/a  n/a  66.7 49.9  805  68.0 54.8 5,413 
                  
All 
years 67.2 55.3  44.1  146,202 66.7  53.0  20,235 67.6  56.4 145,610
                  
Source: FES, GHS and Eurobarometer surveys, various years.  